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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
lature should consider providing for those assaults, which,
although serious in nature due to their aggravating circum-
stances and the harm inflicted, cannot be punished as an
assault with intent to murder due to the absence of intent,
but deserve a more severe treatment than the simple as-
sault.8  This might be done by creating an intermediate
offense such as "assault with intent to commit great bodily
harm."8 9
HENRY F. LEoNN G
Criminal Liability Of Parent For Omission
Causing Death Of Child
Palmer v. State1
Craig v. State'
In Palmer v. State, the defendant's child suffered pro-
longed and brutal beatings at the hands of the defendant's
paramour. Although the defendant was well-aware of
her paramour's sadistic conduct and had received many re-
monstrances from her neighbors, who were concerned
about the child's welfare, she did nothing to prevent the
beatings which ultimately proved fatal. In Craig v. State,
the defendant parents, because of their religious beliefs,
refused to call in medical aid when their child became ill
with pneumonia which subsequently caused the child's
death. In both cases the Court of Appeals found the parents
grossly negligent, but reached different results, since the
gross negligence must be the proximate cause of death to
113 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, J 12, provides for imprisonment from two
to fifteen years for assault with intent to murder. Note that simple assault
is a common law offense and may be punished by fine or imprisonment as
circumstances require, Heath v. State, 198 Md. 455, 466-467, 85 A. 2d 43(1951). In the recent case of Shields v. State, 223 Md. 485, 168 A. 2d
382 (1961) a sentence of 8 years for assault and battery was held not to
be cruel and unusual punishment. It is conceivable that one could be
sentenced for more than 15 years (which is the maximum penalty for
assault with intent to murder) for simple assault. The Oourt could also
take into account what it believed to be Intent to inflict serious harm in
sentencing defendants convicted of simple assault. 'However, it would
seem that defendant's interest in having the trier of fact make a specific
determination supported by evidence might be better preserved, and that
administration might be simplified by the creation of an intermediate of-
fense, particularly since simple assault is a misdemeanor and assault with
intent to kill is a felony. Art. 27, § 12.
"See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 201.10, p. 80 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1960) for the
offense of Bodily Injury.
1223 Md. 341, 164 A. 2d 467 (1960).
2 220 Md. 590, 155 A. 2d 684 (1959).
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sustain a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. In the
Palmer case, the manslaughter conviction was affirmed
because the defendant's negligence was found to be a
proximate cause of death. In the Craig case, the man-
slaughter conviction was reversed for lack of sufficient
proof of a causal connection since the evidence was in-
sufficient to show that by the time the need for a doctor
should have become apparent, the child could have been
saved.
As illustrated by the subject cases, the problem of crim-
inal liability for a parent's failure to render aid to a child in
peril is likely to involve one or more of the following
subsidiary topics, which will be discussed in the order they
appear here: (a) the general nature of a parent's duty to
care for his children and the criminal sanctions imposed
for an omission to perform that duty; (b) the degree of
negligence sufficient for manslaughter, especially as af-
fected by the parent's motives for failing to act; and (c) the
circumstances under which an omission will be deemed to
be a proximate cause of death in such cases.
It is almost universally recognized that where a de-
fendant owed the deceased a legal duty and the duty was
imposed in part to protect life, any omission of that duty
which constitutes gross or criminal negligence and results
in the death of the deceased, renders the defendant
chargeable with manslaughter,8 an intent to kill not being
necessary to the offense.4 In both the Craig and the Palmer
cases, this legal duty is expressed by Article 72A, Section 1
of the Code,4 a wherein it is explicitly provided that "the
father and mother are jointly and severally charged with
the support, care, nurture, welfare and education of their
minor children."
The Craig case interpreted "medical care" as being em-
braced within the scope of this language. This has long
been the statute and common law of England, 5 and of this
country.' Some states, like Maryland, have statutes which
6 U. S. v. Knowles, F. Cas. No. 15,540, 4 Sawy. 517 (D.C. N.D.
Calif. 1864) ; People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907).
' United States v. Holmes, 104 F. 884 (C.C. N.D. Ohio 1900) ; Westrup v.
Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 96, 93 S.W. 646 (1906); Commonwealth v.
Thompson, 6 Mass. 134, 3 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 312 (1809); State v. O'Brien,
32 N.J.L. 169 (1867).
11 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 72A, § 1.
5Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox C.C. 530 (Eng. 1868); Regina v. Hines,
80 Cent. Crt. 309 (Eng. 1874); Regina v. Senior, 19 Cox C.C. 219 (Eng.
1898) ; 31 and 32 Vict., C. 132, § 37 (1868) ; Regina v. Smith, 8 Cur. & P.
153 (1837).
1 State v. Chenowith, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904) ; People v. Pierson,
176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
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merely impose a legal duty without specifying criminal
liability,7 but many states have enacted statutes expressly
imposing criminal liability where a parent or guardian
neglects or refuses to provide necessaries for his children.'
These statutes vary in their wording from those requiring
generally the furnishing of "maintenance and support,"9
to more specific ones requiring explicitly that proper
medical care be provided the child. °
The question involved in the Palmer case is whether or
not a parent is under a legal duty to go to the aid of his
helpless child who is being violently attacked by another.
This question seems to be one of first impression in this coun-
try." In Rex v. Russell,12 an Australian case decided in 1933,
a father who stood by and watched while the mother
drowned their two children was convicted of manslaughter.
The Maryland Court seemed to have no difficulty in the
Palmer case in finding this duty implicit in Section 1 of
Article 72A.
When the legal duty has been established, it is next
necessary to consider if the parent's negligent failure to
perform this duty was sufficient to make him criminally
liable. The defendants in both the Craig and the Palmer
cases were charged with involuntary manslaughter. To
convict of manslaughter based on negligence, it is neces-
sary to prove that the death was caused, not by ordinary
76 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 72A, § 1. See also, 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 26,§ 51, which gives the circuit court for each county jurisdiction in "juvenile
causes." § 52, of that article defines "neglected child" as a child "(4)
whose parent, guardian or custodian neglects, refuses, when able to do
so, to provide necessary medical, surgical, institutional or hospital care
for such child . . . " Under Art. 26, § 53, the judge of the Juvenile Court
is given "original, exclusive jurisdiction" both over a child who is "de-
pendent, delinquent, neglected or feebleminded" 'and over the parent who
causes or contributes to the child's being brought within the jurisdiction
of the court. And finally, § 55, of the same Article, provides for imposition
of criminal sanctions upon persons found guilty of violation of § 52.
14 VERiMER, AMERIcAN FAMILY LAws (1936) § 234, p. 57. State v. Moran,
99 Conn. 115, 121 A. 277 (1923); People v. Booth, 390 Ill. 330, 61 N.E.
2d 370 (1945) ; State v. Waller, 90 Kan. 829, 136 'P. 215 (1913) ; Owens v.
State, 6 Okla. Cr. 110, 116 P. 345 (1911) ; State v. Langford, 90 Or. 251,
176 P. 197 (1918) ; Wallace v. Cox, 136 Tenn. 69, 188 S.W. 611 (1916).
People v. Booth, 390 II. 330, 61 N.E. 2d 370 (1945) ; State v. Waller,
90 Kan. 829, 136 P. 215 (1913) ; Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 110, 116 P.
345 (1911) ; State v. Langford, 90 Or. 251, 176 P. 197 (1918).
10 State v. Moran, 99 Oonn. 115, 121 A. 277 (1923) ; Wallace v. Cox, 136
Tenn. 69, 188 S.W. 611 (1916).
nNote, Criminal Law - Negative Acts - Duty o1 Parent to Protect
Child, 1 Vad.. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1948). Cf., Moffett v. State, 151 Tex. Cr.
App. 320, 207 S.W. 2d 384 (1948) where the court failed ,to sustain the con-
vdction of the parent as a "'principal" under the same -factual situation as
the Palmer case, but under a statutory scheme which obscures its rela-
tionship to the instant case.
'21933 Vict. L. Re. 59 (1933).
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negligence, but by negligent conduct falling so far below
the standard of social acceptability as to be characterized
as "criminal," "culpable," or "gross" negligence. 3 In Mary-
land, to sustain a charge of involuntary manslaughter it
is necessary to show that the failure to perform the legal
duty constituted "gross and wanton negligence,"14 which
has been interpreted in Maryland to mean "a wanton or
reckless disregard for human life."' 5  In determining
whether or not the defendant acted recklessly, the reason-
able man test should be applied. The reasonable man is
generally required to have the common knowledge of the
majority of his fellow men and to act accordingly. 6 If the
reasonable man would be aware that the child would die
or suffer great bodily injury unless it is removed from a
source of physical danger or receives medical aid, then the
accused is reckless in failing to remove the child or in
denying that medical aid, and should be found guilty of
culpable negligence, unless there is some legally acceptable
excuse for his failure to act.
However, the parent's motive for failing to perform his
duty does have some bearing on the degree of his criminal
liability. Where the legal duty to provide medical care
exists and the defendant deliberately withholds sustenance
from a baby with an intent to inflict death or grievous
bodily harm,' 7 or through a desire to save effort or money, 8
and the child's death results, it may be deemed murder.
Where the defendant is guilty of neglect only, but the ne-
glect is culpable, he is guilty of manslaughter. 9 The fact
that the medical aid necessary to save the child's life is
1 2
PERxrNs, CRImINAL LAW (1957) Ch. 2, § 1, p. 61.
1 4Neusbaum v. State, 156 Md. 149, 162, 143 A. 872 (1928).
'
5 Clay v. State, 211 Md. 577, 128 A. 2d 634 (1957); Thomas v. State,
206 Md. 49, 109 A. 2d 909 (1954) ; Hughes v. State, 198 Md. 424, 84 A. 2d
419 (1951).1 Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 52 Am. Rep. 264 (1884);
Regina v. Machekequonabe, 28 Ont. Rep. 309 (1897). There are some
authorities who hold an opposing view and maintain that the reasonable
man must actually possess ithe knowledge in question before he can be
convicted on the grounds that he acted unreasonably. See HALL, GENERAL
PRINcrpLEs OF CRIMINAL LAW (1960) Ch. '5.
17 State v. Chenowith, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904); Commonwealth
v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523, 78 N.E. 2d 644 (1948) ; State v. Watson, 77 N.J.L.
299, 71 A. 1113 (1909) ; State v. Barnes, 141 Tenn. 474, 212 S.W. 100
(1919) ; Regina v. Conde, 10 Oox C.C. 547 (Eng. 1867) ; Regina v. Ryland,
10 Cox C.C. 569, 37 L.J. Mag. Cas. N.S. 10, 17 L.T.N.S. 219, 16 Week. Rep.
280 (1867) ; Regina v. Chandler, 3 C.L.R. 680, 24 L.J. Mag. Cas. N.S. 109,
1 Jur. N.S. 429, 3 Week. Rep. 404, 6 Cox C.C. 519 (1855); Regina v.
Mablet, 5 Cox C.C. 339 (Eng. 1851); Regina v. Bubb, 4 Cox C.C. 455
(Eng. 1850) ; Rex v. Saunders, 17 Car. & P. 277 (Eng. 1835).
18 Commonwealth v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523, 78 N.E. 2d 644 (1948).
'
9
,State v. Barnes, 141 Tenn. 469, 212 S.W. 100 (1919).
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denied because of the defendant's conscientious religious
convictions does not excuse or justify the denial; ° such
motivation is generally considered not to prevent a finding
of culpable negligence.2 But where the defendant tries to
act reasonably and is only guilty of a slight degree of negli-
gence, as when he does not recognize the danger until too
late, and then calls in medical aid, there is probably no
criminal liability.22
Both the Craig and the Palmer cases emphasize that
there can be no conviction of involuntary manslaughter
unless it is shown that the defendant's gross and criminal
negligence was the proximate cause of death,23 i.e., there
must be a substantial causal connection between his negli-
gence and the death that ensued.24  To prove that non-
feasance is a cause of death is a difficult task because in-
action is seldom thought of as the cause of something. In
this type of case there are generally two factors con-
tributing to the death. One is the disease or beating which
is an "active" and obvious cause; the other is the inaction
of the parent which is "passive" and its precise effect is
2 The defendants in ithe Craig case contended that 6 MD. COD (1957)
Art. 72A, § 1, could not be applicable to them, and was unconstitutional on
the grounds that it would deprive them of the free exercise of their
religion guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution. Holding this defense to be untenable, the Court
of Appeals referred to Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), and
said, "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and convictions they may
with practices." 220 Md. 590, 600, 155 A. 2d 684 (1959). While a person is
free to believe as he chooses, he cannot, under the guise of religious con-
viction, act contrary to the laws regulating the health and safety of
society. The text writers and cases are practically unanimous on this
point. See Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 496, 69 A. 2d 456 (1949) ; Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1889); Morrison v.
State, 252 ,S.W. 2d 97 (Mo. 1952); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68
N.E. 243 (1903) ; Regina v. Senior, 12 B. 283 (1899) ; 12 A.L.R. 2d 1047,
1050; 25 Am. Jur., Homicide, § 108. In People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,
411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E. 2d 769 (1952), which involved this same question, the
Illnois court held under a statute similar to the Maryland statute that
it was not a denial of religious freedom to compel parents to provide
medical treatment for their child when necessary. Belief, no matter how
sincere, that a statute is unconstitutional, is no defense in a prosecution
for its violation. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878);
Hunter v. State, 158 Tenn. 63, 12 S.W. 2d 361 (1928) ; State v. Wadhams
Oil Oo., 149 Wis. 58, 134 N.W. 1121 (1912) ; 61 A.L.R. 1148; 1 WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) § 415, p. 614.
1 State v. Chenowith, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904); Commonwealth v.
Hall, 322 Mass. 523, 78 N.E. 2d 644 (1948) ; State v. Barnes, 141 Tenn.
469, 212 S.W. 100 (1919).
State v. Watson, 77 N.J.L. 299, 71 A. 1113 (1909).
2 State v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 671, 74 A. 927 (1910); Regina v. Morby,
L.R. 8 Q.B. Div. Eng. 571, 15 Cox C.C. 35, 30 Week. Rep. 613, 46 L.T.N.S.
288 (1882) ; PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw (1957) 525.
2, Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 102 A. 2d 277 (1954).
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difficult to see or estimate. Nevertheless, the problems of
causation are generally the same whether the death is
caused by positive action or by negative action.2" It is not
necessary to show that the defendant's act was the sole
cause of harm; it need only be a contributing cause in order
to hold him liable.2 6 But it is necessary to prove that this
contributory cause is a sine qua non, i.e., but for this cause
the death would not have occurred in the manner that it
did, and further, that it was a substantial factor in bringing
about this particular result.27 "If the death would not have
happened except for this non-performance the causal re-
lation is clear; if it would have happened just as it did even
had the duty been properly performed, the failure so to
perform did not cause the loss of life."2" It was on this
last mentioned point that Craig and Palmer results differed.
In the Palmer case, the court quoted from WHARTON :29
"It is not essential to the existence of a causal rela-
tionship that the ultimate harm which has resulted,
was foreseen or intended by the actor. It is sufficient
that the ultimate harm is one which a reasonable man
would foresee as being reasonably related to the acts
of the defendant * * * To constitute the cause of the
harm, it is not necessary that the defendant's act be
the sole reason for the realization of the harm which
has been sustained by the victim. The defendant does
not cease to be responsible for his otherwise criminal
conduct because there were other conditions which
contributed to the same result."80
The Court found that the beatings were not the sole
legal cause, and that the defendant's failure to remove her
child from danger was a contributing cause of death,
without really emphasizing the factor that the defendant's
omission must also be a sine qua non cause. However, it
is probable that if the defendant had intervened to pro-
tect the child, the death would not have occurred. On the
other hand, the court in the Craig case laid great stress
on the fact that although the defendants clearly failed to
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW (1957) 600.
Id., 609.
In other words, "no matter how clearly a legal duty to care for a child
may have been violated, the forbearance or omission is not a cause of the
child's death unless it had the effect of shortening the child's life."
PERKINS, loc oft. supra, n. 25.
OPERKINs, Zoo. cit. 8upra, n. 25.
1 ANDERSON, WHARTON's CRIMINAL LAW AND 'PROCEDUR (1957) § 68,
p. 147.
8°Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 351, 164 A. 2d 467 (1960).
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perform their legal duty, they were not criminally negli-
gent in such failure until the last few days of the child's
illness when it became obvious that the illness was serious.
There was insufficient evidence to show that even if they
had called in medical aid at that time, the child's life could
have been saved. Therefore, it could not be proved that
the death would not have occurred substantially as it did
had the legal duty been properly performed, and thus the
defendants' inaction was not the proximate cause of death.
As the instant cases indicate, a parent has a definite
legal duty to care for his minor child imposed by Article
72A,31 and where such parent's gross negligence in failing
to perform this duty is shown to be the proximate cause
of his child's death, he may be guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter; also, the "religious beliefs" of the parent will
not be a defense, although some courts have indicated that
the parent's motive for neglecting his child will have some
bearing on the degree of criminal liability imposed.2
HAUURTTE COHEN
6 MD. CoDm (1957) Art. 72A, § 1.
82 Supra, n. 20.
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